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Abstract
For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we
investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost
as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value functions of λ -discounted
games as the discount tends to zero. We prove that the Dynamic Programming Principle
for value functions directly leads to the Tauberian Theorem—that the existence of a
uniform limit of the value functions for one of the families implies that the other one also
uniformly converges to the same limit. No assumptions on strategies are necessary. To this
end, we consider a mapping that takes each payoff to the corresponding value function and
preserves the sub- and super- optimality principles (the Dynamic Programming Principle).
With their aid, we obtain certain inequalities on asymptotics of sub- and super- solutions,
which lead to the Tauberian Theorem. In particular, we consider the case of differential
games without relying on the existence of the saddle point; a very simple stochastic game
model is also considered.
Keywords: Dynamic programming principle, Abel mean, Cesaro mean, differential
games, zero-sum games
MSC2010 91A25, 49L20, 49N70, 91A23, 40E05
1 Introduction
Hardy proved (see, for example, [23, Sect. 6.8]) that, for a bounded continuous function g , the
limit of long run averages and the limit of discounted averages (Cesaro mean and Abel mean,
∗Krasovskii Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 16, S.Kovalevskaja St.,
620990, Yekaterinburg, Russia; Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Ural Federal University, 4,
Turgeneva St., 620083, Yekaterinburg, Russia
1
respectively)
1
T
∫ T
0
g(t) dt, λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(t) dt
coincide if there exists at least one of these limits. This result and its generalizations have
many applications (see, for example, [8, 18, 29]).
Let us consider the analogs of this Tauberian theorem for asymptotics of optimal values in
game-theoretic problem statements. What if we optimize the Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean
and then consider the limit of the optimal values corresponding to them? Such a limit value (as
the discount tends to zero) was first considered in [9] for a stochastic formulation. As proved
in [7], for a stochastic two-person game with a finite number of states and actions, optimal
long-time averages and optimal discounted averages share the common limit. For more details
on the limit value for Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean in other stochastic formulations, see
[24, 32, 35, 42, 46, 48, 50].
In the deterministic case, the question of existence of limit values arose in the control theory,
time and again; one may at the very least note [12, 14, 20]. In the ergodic case (more generally,
in the nonexpansive-like case) such limits exist and, moreover, they are usually independent
of the initial state, which was demonstrated in [3, 6, 17]; although the results were released
roughly at the same time, the methods of obtaining them were thoroughly different. For the
latest results on existence of limits of such values (for the nonexpansive-like case), see also [10,
Sect. 3.4],[11, 21, 34, 41].
A Tauberian theorem (the equality of limit values) was proved for discrete time systems in
[33]. The same result was obtained under an additional assumption that one of those limits
is a constant function for control problems [2] and for differential games [1]. Note that, even
in simple cases of control problems, the limits may not be constant functions [22, 41]. In
the general (non-ergodic) case, a Tauberian theorem for very general dynamic systems was
first proved in paper [40]. Then, in [26], a Tauberian theorem was proposed for differential
games (under Isaacs’s condition). Later, in [49], a very general approach to proving Tauberian
theorems was proposed for games with two players with opposite goals in discrete setting.
In particular, it implies the same result for recursive games [35]. Note that, in addition to
uniform and exponential payoff families, the Tauberian theorems can be formulated for arbitrary
probability densities. The corresponding results are known for discrete time systems [38, 43]
and for optimal control and games [27, 34, 50].
The cornerstone of papers [26, 40] is the construction of near-optimal strategies for one of the
averages by pieces of near-optimal strategies for another average. It requires some assumptions
on players’ strategies, in particular, the Dynamic Programming Principle; in addition, for
games, there must be the existence of saddle point (see [26, 27], and unpublished work [25]).
Paper [49] exhibits a more subtle approach. In stochastic games, the value is a fixed point of
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the Shapley operator for the corresponding game. Parameterized (by the discount or the finite
horizon) families of the corresponding Shapley operators were embedded into certain Lipschitz
continuous families of nonexpansive operators, and the corresponding Tauberian theorem was
proved for the fixed points of the latter operators.
The main aim of this paper is to obtain the Tauberian theorem as a direct consequence of
the Dynamic Programming Principle without any technical assumptions on strategies, payoff
functions, or anything else. To this end, we introduce a mapping (called a game value map)
that assigns to every payoff the corresponding value function. In the general case, this map
can be constructed only by payoff functions corresponding to the Abel mean and Cesaro mean
as payoffs, no strategies required. Considering a properly chosen chain of payoffs, using the
monotonicity of the game value map and sub- and super- optimality principles, we obtain
one-sided inequalities on asymptotics leading to all Tauberian theorems. Since no additional
assumptions are imposed on the players’ strategies (compare with [26, 25]), neither topological
nor measurable structures are used (compare with [50]) to prove the Tauberian theorem itself,
not even the existence of saddle point (as in [26, 27, 49]) is required, although a reduction to
the typical formalization will apparently require some of these.
We also apply this general theorem to zero-sum dynamic games in continuous and discrete
settings and to differential games without a saddle point.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by formulating the Tauberian theorem
for dynamic games in continuous setting (Theorem 1) in Sect. 2. Then, we consider the general
statement: we define the concept of a game value map and formulate the Tauberian theorem for
this map (Theorem 2) and the one-side inequalities on asymptotics (Propositions 1–4). Sect. 4
contains the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the Tauberian theorem
for games in discrete setting (Theorem 3) and for differential games (Theorem 4), respectively.
Also, the Tauberian theorem for a very simple stochastic game model (Corollary 2) is shown
in Sect. 5. The unwieldy and cumbersome proofs of propositions are confined to Appendix.
2 A dynamic zero-sum game
Dynamic system. Set R+
△
= R≥0. Assume the following items are given:
• a nonempty set Ω , the state space;
• a nonempty set K of maps from R+ to Ω ;
• a running cost g : Ω 7→ [0, 1] ; for each process z ∈ K , the map t 7→ g(z(t)) is assumed
to be Borel measurable.
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On payoffs. Let us now define a time average vT (z) and a discount average wλ(z) for
each process z ∈ K by the following rules:
vT (z)
△
=
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z(t)) dt, wλ(z)
△
= λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt ∀T, λ > 0, z ∈ K.
Note that the definitions are valid, and the means lie within [0, 1].
On lower games. For all ω ∈ Ω , let there be given non-empty sets L(ω) and M(ω). Let,
for all ω ∈ Ω , each pair (l, m) ∈ L(ω) ×M(ω) of players’ rules generate a unique process
z[ω, l,m] ∈ K such that z[ω, l,m](0) = ω .
The lower game is conducted in the following way: for a given ω ∈ Ω, the first player shows
l ∈ L(ω) , and then, the second player chooses m ∈M(ω) . The value function of this game is
V[c](ω)
△
= sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
c(z[ω, l,m]) ∀ω ∈ Ω. (1)
For instance, for every T, λ > 0 , the payoffs vT , wλ generate the following value functions:
VT (ω)
△
= V[vT ](ω) = sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt ∀ω ∈ Ω,
Wλ(ω)
△
= V[wλ](ω) = sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
∫ ∞
0
λe−λtg(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Let us say that the payoff family vT (T > 0) enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle
iff, for all T > 0 , the value function VT coincides with the value functions for the following
payoffs:
K ∋ z 7→
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T − h
T
VT−h(z(h)) ∀h ∈ (0, T ).
Let us say that the payoff family wλ(λ > 0) enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle
iff, for all λ > 0 , the value function Wλ coincides with the value functions for the following
payoffs:
K ∋ z 7→ λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhWλ(z(h)) ∀h > 0.
Theorem 1 Assume that the payoff families vT (T > 0) and wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the Dynamic
Programming Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The family of functions VT (T > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as T ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The family of functions Wλ (λ > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as λ ↓ 0 .
Moreover, when at least one of these statements holds, we have
lim
T↑∞
VT (ω) = lim
λ↓0
Wλ(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
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For the proof of this theorem, refer to Sect. 4.
On abstract control systems. We can obtain the Tauberian theorem for an abstract
control system. Following [40], assume the sets Ω , K to be given; for all ω ∈ Ω , let L(ω)
be the set of all feasible processes z ∈ K that begin at ω . Let M(ω) be a singleton for all
ω ∈ Ω .
Now, Theorem 1 implies
Corollary 1 Assume that the payoff families vT (T > 0) and wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the Dynamic
Programming Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The maps Ω ∋ ω 7→ supz∈L(ω) vT (z) converge uniformly on Ω as T ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The maps Ω ∋ ω 7→ supz∈L(ω) wλ(z) converge uniformly on Ω as λ ↓ 0 .
Moreover, when at least one of these statements holds, we have
lim
T↑∞
sup
z∈L(ω)
vT (z) = lim
λ↓0
sup
z∈L(ω)
wλ(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
In [40], it is stated that the Tauberian theorem holds for an abstract control system if K is
closed with respect to concatenation. This condition can be refined, see [28].
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 look similar to Tauberian theorems for dynamic zero-sum game
and control system with continuous setting, respectively, in the most general statement. Never-
theless, let us sketch the examples when this similarity is misleading. In certain game problems
with information discrimination, the second player has to choose m from M(ω, l) instead
of from M(ω) [13]. Value functions with inf l supm infτ instead of supl infm are applied in
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs variational inequalities [47, (17.7)] and pursuit-evasion-defense prob-
lems [19, (12)]. Finally, for instance, for the control problem, a maximization of the expectation
of the payoff with respect to some probability distribution (see, for instance, [39, (11.3.2)], [31,
(2.5)]) is not covered by Corollary 1. For this reason, in the next section, we introduce a map-
ping (called a game value map) that assigns to each payoff the corresponding value function,
and then we formulate the Tauberian theorem for game value map.
3 General statement.
On game value map. Let the sets Ω and K , running cost g , and payoffs vT , wλ be as
before. Denote by U the set of all bounded maps from Ω to R ; denote by C a non-empty set
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of maps from K to R . Thereinafter, the set C incorporates all conceivable payoffs, and the
set U contains all value functions for all games with payoffs c ∈ C.
Let C satisfy the following condition:
Ac+B ∈ C for all A ≥ 0, B ∈ R if c ∈ C. (2a)
In this section, we also assume that vT , wλ ∈ C for all positive λ, T.
A map V from C to U is called a game value map if the following conditions hold:
V [Ac+B] = AV [c] +B for all c ∈ C, A ≥ 0, B ∈ R, (2b)
V [c1](ω) ≤ V [c2](ω) for all ω ∈ Ω if c1(z) ≤ c2(z) for all z ∈ K. (2c)
On Dynamic Programming Principle. For all positive λ, T, h > 0 and every function
U∗ : Ω→ R , define payoffs ζ
U∗
h,T : K→ R , ξ
U∗
h,λ : K→ R as follows:
ζU∗h,T (z)
△
=
1
T + h
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T
T + h
U∗(z(h)) ∀z ∈ K;
ξU∗h,λ(z)
△
= λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhU∗(z(h)) ∀z ∈ K.
Definition 1 For a game value map V , let us say that a family of UT ∈ U(T > 0) is a
subsolution
(
a supersolution
)
for the family of payoffs vT (T > 0) if, for every ε > 0 , there
exists natural T¯ such that, for all natural h, T > T¯ , the payoff ζUTh,T lies in C and enjoys
UT+h ≤ V [ζ
UT
h,T ] + ε
(
UT+h ≥ V [ζ
UT
h,T ]− ε
)
.
For a game value map V , let us say that a family of Uλ ∈ U(λ > 0) is a subsolution
(
a
supersolution
)
for the family of payoffs wλ(λ > 0) if, for every ε > 0 , there exists natural T¯
such that, for all natural h > T¯ and positive λ < 1/T¯ , the payoff ξUλh,λ ∈ C lies in C and
enjoys
Uλ ≤ V [ξ
Uλ
h,λ] + ε
(
Uλ ≥ V [ξ
Uλ
h,λ]− ε
)
.
For similar definitions, refer to the suboptimality principle [5, Definition III.2.31] (also referred
to as ‘stability with respect to second player’ [30]) and [5, Sect. VI.4] for discrete setting.
Definition 2 For a game value map V , let us say that the family of payoffs vT (T > 0) (resp.,
wλ(λ > 0) ) enjoys the weak Dynamic Programming Principle iff their value functions ( V [vT ]
and, resp., V [wλ] ) are, at the same time, a subsolution and a supersolution for this payoff
family.
In particular, the family of payoffs vT (T > 0) (resp., wλ(λ > 0) ) enjoys the weak Dynamic
Programming Principle if
V [vT+h] = V [ζ
V [vT ]
h,T ],
(
V [wλ] = V [ξ
V [wλ]
h,λ ]
)
∀h, T ∈ N, λ > 0.
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Theorem 2 Let there be given a game value map V : C→ U. Let vT , wλ ∈ C for all λ, T > 0.
Assume that payoffs vT (T > 0) and payoffs wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic Programming
Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The family of functions V [vT ] (T > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as T ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The family of functions V [wλ] (λ > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as λ ↓ 0 .
Moreover, when at least one of these statements holds, we have
lim
T↑∞
V [vT ](ω) = lim
λ↓0
V [wλ](ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
This theorem generalizes Theorem 1. For its proof, refer to Sect. 4.
One-sided Tauberian theorems for bounds from above. In Appendix B, we prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For a game value map V , let a family of functions UT ∈ U(T > 0) and
the family of functions V [wλ](λ > 0) be a subsolution for payoffs vT and a supersolution for
payoffs wλ , respectively.
Further, let UT (T > 0) satisfy
lim sup
T↑∞
sup
p∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
(
UT (ω)− UTp(ω)
)
≤ 0. ∀p0 > 1. (3a)
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that
V [wλ](ω) ≥ U1/λ(ω)− ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ (0, 1/N).
In Appendix C, we prove a similar proposition, where the payoff families are swapped:
Proposition 2 For a game value map V , let a family of functions Uλ ∈ U(λ > 0) and the
family of functions V [vT ](T > 0) be a subsolution for payoffs wλ and a supersolution for
payoffs vT , respectively.
Further, let Uλ(λ > 0) satisfy
lim sup
λ↓0
sup
p∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
(
Uλ(ω)− Upλ(ω)
)
≤ 0 ∀p0 > 1. (3b)
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that
V [vT ](ω) ≥ U1/T (ω)− ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, T > N.
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The inequalities similar to ( 3a ) will be found in other Tauberian Theorems, (see [8, Defi-
nition 4.1.4],[23, Sect.6.2],[37, Theorem 4.1]). Also, we may take p = p0 instead of supp∈[1,p0]
in ( 3a ) and ( 3b ) for UT
△
= V [vT ] and Uλ
△
= V [wλ] using ( 8a ) and ( 8b ) (see Appendix A),
respectively. On the other hand, conditions ( 3a ) and ( 3b ) are tight enough for UT
△
= V [vT ]
and Uλ
△
= V [wλ] , respectively. In particular, if in Proposition 2 one replaces ( 3b ) with the
following condition
lim
p0↓1
lim sup
λ↓0
sup
p∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
∣∣V [wλ](ω)− V [wpλ](ω)∣∣ = 0,
which holds for all game value maps from ( 8b ) , then Proposition 2 would fail for a certain
game value map (see, for example, [40, Sect. 4] for control problems).
One-sided Tauberian theorems for bounds from below. Applying these propositions
to C∗
△
= {−c | c ∈ C} , V ∗[c] ≡ −V [−c] , g∗ ≡ 1− g instead of C, V, g , we obtain:
Proposition 3 For a game value map V , let a family of functions UT ∈ U(T > 0) and the
family of functions V [wλ](λ > 0) be a supersolution for the payoffs vT and a subsolution for
the payoffs wλ , respectively.
Further, let UT (T > 0) satisfy
lim sup
T↑∞
sup
p∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
(
UTp(ω)− UT (ω)
)
≤ 0. ∀p0 > 1. (3c)
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that
V [wλ](ω) ≤ U1/λ(ω) + ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ (0, 1/N).
Proposition 4 For a game value map V , let a family of functions Uλ ∈ U(λ > 0) and the
family of functions V [vT ](T > 0) be a supersolution for the payoffs wλ and a subsolution for
the payoffs vT , respectively.
Further, let Uλ(λ > 0) satisfy
lim sup
λ↓0
sup
p∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
(
Upλ(ω)− Uλ(ω)
)
≤ 0 ∀p0 > 1. (3d)
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that
V [vT ](ω) ≤ U1/T (ω) + ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, T > N.
For simplicity we could define C as the set of all bounded maps from K to R . It would
be sufficient for proofs of all theorems of this article. We do not do it due to the following
reasons. First, in stochastic frameworks, each payoff c has to be measurable with respect to
some measurable space, see, for instance, Corollary 2 in Sect. 5. Secondly, all proofs use merely
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the boundedness of vT , wλ , and the additional requirement does not appear to help to obtain
the bounds.
Also note that in the definitions of subsolution and supersolution, we consider only natural
h and T . However, this strengthening is useless for continuous setting, whereas in discrete-
time setting it allows a direct usage of the corresponding Dynamic Programming Principle (see
Section 5).
4 Proofs of main results
Proof of Theorem 2. Since the payoffs vT (T > 0) and the payoffs wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the
weak Dynamic Programming Principle, we see that V [vT ](T > 0) and V [wλ](λ > 0) are
simultaneously super- and subsolutions with respect to V for the payoffs vT and for the
payoffs wλ respectively.
If at least one of the considered limits exists and is uniform in Ω, then, either the limit of
V [vT ] as T ↑ ∞, or the limit of V [wλ] as λ ↓ 0 exists and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Assume that it is the limit of V [vT ] as T ↑ ∞. It follows that ( 3a ) and ( 3c ) hold for
UT = V [vT ] . From Propositions 1 and 3, we infer that, for all ε > 0 , |V [vT ](ω)−V [w1/T ](ω)| <
ε holds for all ω ∈ Ω if T is sufficient large. Thus, the limit of V [wλ] as λ ↓ 0 exists, is
uniform, and coincides with the limit of V [vT ] as T ↑ ∞.
The case of the limit for V [wλ] is considered analogously. It is only necessary to apply
conditions ( 3b ) and ( 3d ) and Propositions 2 and 4. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let the set of all bounded maps from K to R be the set C . This
set satisfies ( 2a ) , and wλ, vT , ζ
VT
T,h, ξ
Wλ
λ,h ∈ C for all positive λ, T and natural h . Note that
the map V (see ( 1 ) ) takes each payoff c : K → R to a function V[c] : Ω → R . Since V
satisfies conditions ( 2b ) – ( 2c ) , this map is a game value map.
To finish the proof, we can now apply Theorem 2. 
5 Tauberian theorem in discrete time setting
On dynamics. Let there be given sets Ω , K and a running cost g , as before. Assume that
we would like to consider any process as a function from {0, 1, 2, . . . } to Ω . Since, for such a
function, its definition can be completed in the form
z(k + t)
△
= z(k) ∀k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, t ∈ (0, 1), (4)
we can propose that this function is from R+ to Ω and lies in K . Thus, in this section, we
can assume that all z ∈ K satisfy ( 4 ) .
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On payoffs. Recall that U is the set of all bounded maps from Ω to R . Let us consider a
non-empty set C of maps from K to R and a game value map V : C→ U satisfying conditions
( 2a ) and ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) , respectively.
For all µ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N , define payoffs v¯n : K→ R, w¯µ : K→ R as follows:
v¯n(z) =
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
g(z(t)) ∈ [0, 1], w¯µ(z) = µ
∞∑
t=0
(1− µ)tg(z(t)) ∈ [0, 1] ∀z ∈ K.
Also, assume that v¯n, w¯µ ∈ C for all µ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N .
On Dynamic Programming Principle. Let us say that the family of payoffs v¯n(n ∈ N)
enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle iff, for all n, h ∈ N , the payoff
K¯ ∋ z 7→
1
n+ h
h−1∑
t=0
g(z(t)) +
n
n+ h
V [v¯n](z(h)) (5a)
lies in C and the value of V for this payoff coincides with V [v¯n+h]
Let us say that the family of payoffs w¯µ(µ > 0) enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle
iff, for all µ ∈ (0, 1) , the function V [w¯µ] coincides with values of V for payoffs
K ∋ z 7→ µ
h−1∑
t=0
(1− µ)tg(z(t)) + (1− µ)hV [w¯µ](z(h)) ∀h ∈ N, (5b)
and each of these payoffs lies in C .
Theorem 3 Let all processes z ∈ K satisfy ( 4 ) . Let, for a game value map V : C→ U , the
payoff families v¯n(n ∈ N) and w¯µ(µ > 0) enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The sequence of functions V [v¯n] (n ∈ N) converges uniformly on Ω as n ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The family of functions V [w¯µ] (0 < µ < 1) converges uniformly on Ω as µ ↓ 0 .
Moreover, when at least one of these statements holds, we have
lim
n↑∞
V [v¯n](ω) = lim
µ↓0
V [w¯µ](ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Theorem 3. We will use estimate ( 8a ) and Lemma 1 proved in Appendix A.
Denote by Cb the set of all bounded maps from K to R . We can assume C ⊂ Cb ; otherwise,
we would always use C ∩ Cb instead of C. Now, by Lemma 1, we can set V [c] ∈ U for all
c ∈ Cb \C such that conditions ( 2b ) – ( 2c ) keep to hold. Thus, we obtain the game value map
V : Cb → U.
Consider a function µ∗ : R>0 → (0, 1) defined as follows: µ
∗(λ) = 1 − e−λ for all λ > 0 .
Then,
∫ t+1
t
λe−λr dr = e−λtµ∗(λ) = (1 − µ∗(λ))tµ∗(λ) for all t ≥ 0, λ > 0 . Now, ( 4 ) implies
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w¯µ∗(λ) ≡ wλ for all λ > 0 . Note that µ
∗(0+) = 0+ . Then, the limit of V [w¯µ] as µ ↓ 0 exists
and is uniform in Ω iff the limit of V [wλ] as λ ↓ 0 exists and is uniform in Ω . Moreover, in
this case, these limits coincide.
Also, it is easy to see that v¯n ≡ vn for all n ∈ N. Since the payoffs vT (T > 0) are bounded,
we have vT ∈ Cb for all T > 0. For each T > 0 , we can choose n ∈ N such that T ∈ (n−1, n] ,
hence, we obtain
|V [v¯n](ω)− V [vT ](ω)|
( 8a )
≤
2(n− T )
T
≤
2
T
∀ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, the limit of V [v¯T ] as T ↑ ∞ exists and is uniform in Ω iff the limit of V [v¯n] as n→∞
exists and is uniform in Ω . Moreover, in this case, these limits coincide.
At last, thanks to ( 4 ) and w¯µ∗(λ) ≡ wλ , v¯n ≡ vn for all n ∈ N, λ > 0, we have that, for
all natural T = n, h ∈ N and positive λ, payoffs ( 5a ) and ( 5b ) coincide with ζ
V [vT ]
T,h and
ξ
V [wλ]
λ,h , respectively. Therefore, the payoff families wλ(λ > 0) and vT (T > 0) enjoy the weak
Dynamic Programming Principle.
We have verified all conditions of Theorem 2. Moreover, the corresponding limits in The-
orem 2 and in Theorem 3 exist and are uniform in ω ∈ Ω only simultaneously. Thanks to
Theorem 2, Theorem 3 is proved. 
Let us showcase the application of this approach in a stochastic framework.
Consider a σ -algebra A on K . Assume that CA is the set of all A -measurable bounded
maps of K to R . It is easy to see that CA satisfies the condition ( 2a ) .
Similarly to Section 2, for all ω ∈ Ω , let there be given non-empty sets L(ω) and M(ω) .
Let, for all ω ∈ Ω , each pair (l, m) ∈ L(ω) × M(ω) of players’ rules induce a probability
distribution Pωlm (over (K,A) ) along with its mathematical expectation E
ω
lm . Similarly to
( 1 ) , define the map W : CA → U by the following rule: for each c ∈ C ,
W [c](ω)
△
= sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
E
ω
lmc ∀ω ∈ Ω. (6)
Evidently, W : C→ U satisfies conditions ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) . Thus, W is a game value map.
Applying Theorem 3 for this game value map W, we obtain
Corollary 2 Let all processes z ∈ K satisfy ( 4 ) . Also, assume that for all µ ∈ (0, 1) , n ∈ N
the payoffs v¯n, w¯µ are A -measurable.
Let, for the game value map W : C → U (see ( 6 ) ), the payoff families v¯n(n ∈ N) and
w¯µ(0 < µ < 1) enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The maps Ω ∋ ω 7→ sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
E
ω
lmv¯n converge uniformly on Ω as n ↑ ∞.
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(ıı) The maps Ω ∋ ω 7→ sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
E
ω
lmw¯µ converge uniformly on Ω as µ ↓ 0 .
Moreover, when at least one of these statements holds, we have
lim
n↑∞
sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
E
ω
lmv¯n = lim
µ↓0
sup
l∈L(ω)
inf
m∈M(ω)
E
ω
lmw¯µ ∀ω ∈ Ω.
6 Differential games without saddle point.
Dynamic equation. Consider a nonlinear system in Rm controlled by two players,
x˙ = f(x, a, b), x(0) ∈ Rm, a(t) ∈ A, b(t) ∈ B; (7)
here, A and B are non-empty compact subsets of finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces.
In this section, we assume that
1. the functions f : Rm × A× B→ Rm , g : Rm × A× B→ [0, 1] are continuous;
2. these functions are Lipschitz continuous in the state variable, namely, for a constant
L > 0 ,
∣∣∣∣f(x, a, b)− f(y, a, b)∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣g(x, a, b)− g(y, a, b)∣∣ ≤ L∣∣∣∣x− y∣∣∣∣ ∀x, y ∈ Rm, a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
Denote by B(R+,A) and by B(R+,B) the sets of all Borel measurable functions R+ ∋
t 7→ a(t) ∈ A and R+ ∋ t 7→ b(t) ∈ B , respectively. Now, for each pair (a, b) ∈ B(R+,A) ×
B(R+,B) , for every initial condition x(0) = x∗ , system ( 7 ) generates the unique solution
x(·) = y(·; x∗, a, b) defined for the whole R+ . Denote by Y (x∗) the set of all such solutions
with x(0) = x∗ .
Consider a set X ⊂ Rm that is strongly invariant with respect to system ( 7 ) , i.e., let
x(t) ∈ X for all t ∈ R+ , x∗ ∈ X, x ∈ Y (x∗) . Set Y
△
= ∪x∗∈XY (x∗).
On strategies of players. Like before, let the goal of the first player be to maximize the
payoff function and let the task of the second one be to minimize it. Our payoff functions are
as follows: for all λ, T > 0, (x, a, b) ∈ Y× B(R+,A)×B(R+,B),
vT (x, a, b)
△
=
1
T
∫ T
0
g(x(t), a(t), b(t)) dt,
wλ(x, a, b)
△
= λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(x(t), a(t), b(t)) dt.
In the general case, without Isaacs’s condition, the lower game value and the upper game
value depend on choosing the formalization of strategies of players [30, Ch. XVI], [47, Sub-
sect. 14], [5]. For simplicity, we now assume that the first player announces a nonanticipating
strategy (see [15, 44, 45]) and another, knowing it, selects an admissible measurable control.
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Definition 3 A map α : B(R+,B) 7→ B(R+,A) is called a nonanticipating strategy for the first
player if, for all t > 0 and b, b′ ∈ B(R+,B) , b|[0,t] = b
′|[0,t] implies that α[b]|[0,t] = α[b
′]|[0,t] .
We denote by A the set of all nonanticipating strategies for the first player.
Now, for all T, λ > 0, we can define lower game values,
VT (x∗)
△
= sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B(R+,B)
vT (y(·; x∗, α(b), b), α(b), b) ∀x∗ ∈ X,
Wλ(x∗)
△
= sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B(R+,B)
wλ(y(·; x∗, α(b), b), α(b), b) ∀x∗ ∈ X.
Constructing a game value map. Let us set
Ω
△
= X× A× B, K
△
= Y×B(R+,A)× B(R+,B).
Let C be the set of all bounded maps from K to R ; this set satisfies ( 2a ) , and wλ, vT ,
ζVTT,h, ξ
Wλ
λ,h ∈ C for each positive λ, T and natural h . For every map c ∈ C , we can consider the
following value function:
V [c](x∗, a∗, b∗)
△
= sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B(R+,B)
c(y(·; x∗, α(b), b), α(b), b) ∀ω = (x∗, a∗, b∗) ∈ Ω.
It is easy prove that V : C→ U satisfies ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) . Thus, we obtain the game value map V.
The dynamic programming principle with respect to nonanticipating strategies for Bolza
functionals (particularly, for the payoffs vT ) is well-known, see [16, 47]. Such a principle for
the payoff function wλ follows from [4, Theorem VIII.1.9]. All conditions of Theorem 2 verify.
Moreover, V [wλ] ≡ Wλ , V [vT ] ≡ VT are independent of a∗, b∗ . Now, thanks to Theorem 2,
we obtain
Theorem 4 Let f, g be as before, and let a non-empty set X ⊂ Rm be strongly invariant with
respect to ( 7 ) .
Then, for a function U∗ : X→ [0, 1] , U∗ is a limit of VT as T ↑ ∞ that is uniform in X
iff U∗ is a limit of Wλ as λ ↓ 0 that is uniform in X.
Under Isaacs’s condition, this theorem was proved in [26].
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A Auxiliary statements.
Assume a non-empty set C satisfies ( 2a ) and a game value map V : C → U enjoys ( 2b ) ,
( 2c ) .
Two estimates. Consider T > 0, r > 1 , and z ∈ K. Assume vT , vrT ∈ C . Now,
|vT (z)− vrT (z)| =
∣∣∣ 1
T
∫ T
0
g(z(t)) dt−
1
rT
∫ rT
0
g(z(t)) dt
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ 1
T
−
1
rT
∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
g(z(t)) dt+
1
rT
∫ rT
T
g(z(t)) dt
≤ 1−
1
r
+
r − 1
r
=
2r − 2
r
< 2(r − 1).
So, vrT (z) − 2(r − 1) ≤ vT (z) ≤ vrT (z) + 2(r − 1) for all z ∈ K . Thanks to ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) , we
obtain ∣∣∣V [vT ](ω)− V [vrT ](ω)∣∣∣ ≤ 2(r − 1) ∀ω ∈ Ω. (8a)
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Consider λ > 0, r > 1 , and z ∈ K. Assume wλ, wrλ ∈ C . Now,
|wλ(z)− wrλ(z)| =
∣∣∣λ ∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt− rλ
∫ ∞
0
e−rλtg(z(t)) dt
∣∣∣
≤
∫ ∞
0
|λe−λt − rλe−rλt|g(z(t)) dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
|λe−λt − rλe−rλt| dt
= 2
∫ ∞
0
max{λe−λt, rλe−rλt} dt−
∫ ∞
0
λe−λt dt−
∫ ∞
0
rλe−rλt dt
≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
rλe−λt dt− 2 = 2(r − 1).
Thus, ∣∣∣V [wλ](ω)− V [wrλ](ω)∣∣∣ ≤ 2(r − 1) ∀ω ∈ Ω. (8b)
On extension of V . Denote by Cb the set of all bounded maps from K to R . Assume
C ⊂ Cb .
Note that ( 2a ) holds for Cb . Define a map Vb : Cb → U as follows:
Vb[c
′](ω)
△
= sup{V [c](ω) | c ∈ C, c ≤ c′} ∀ω ∈ Ω, c′ ∈ Cb.
Since, for all R ∈ R, c ∈ C , the inequality −R ≤ c ≤ R implies −R = V [−R] ≤ V [c] ≤
V [R] = R by ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) , the function Vb[c
′] is well-defined and bounded for every c′ ∈ Cb .
It is easy to prove that ( 2b ) and ( 2c ) hold for Vb. In addition,
Vb[c
′′](ω)
△
= sup{V [c](ω) | c ∈ C, c ≤ c′′}
( 2c )
= V [c′′](ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω, c′′ ∈ C.
So, Vb|C ≡ V. Thus, we have proved
Lemma 1 Let a non-empty set C ⊂ Cb satisfy ( 2a ) and a map V : C→ U enjoy ( 2b ) and
( 2c ) . Then, the map Vb : Cb → U enjoys ( 2b ) and ( 2c ) and is an extension of V .
B The proof of Proposition 1.
On simplicity of notation.
For all payoff functions c , let us also use the following notation:
[c]ω ≡ V [c](ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
For instance, for a function U∗ : Ω → R and ω ∈ Ω , the symbol [U∗(z(1))]ω means V [c](ω)
for the payoff function K ∋ z 7→ c(z) = U∗(z(1)) ∈ R . The symbol [U∗(z1(1))]ω also means
the same for the same payoff. Moreover, the symbols[ ∫ h
0
a(t)g(z(t)) dt+ U∗(z(h))
]
ω
,
[
[U∗(z1(1))]z(1)
]
ω
,
[ ∫ h
0
b(t)g(z1(t)) dt+ [c]z1(h)
]
z(h′)
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denote the value of the game value map for the payoff function K ∋ z 7→
∫ h
0
a(t)g(z(t)) dt +
U∗(z(h)) ∈ R at ω , for the payoff function K ∋ z 7→ c1(z) = [U∗(z1(1))]z(1) ∈ R at ω , for the
payoff function
K ∋ z1 7→
∫ h
0
b(t)g(z1(t)) dt+ V [c](z1(h)) ∈ R
at z(h′) , respectively. Now, the expression
[
[U∗(z5(1))]z2(1)
]
ω
is equal to
[
[U∗(z1(1))]z(1)
]
ω
,
similarly to e.g. the equivalence of
∫
A
f(x)
∫
B
g(y)dydx and
∫
A
f(r)
∫
B
g(s)dsdr.
Auxiliary estimates. Recall that Cb is the set of all bounded maps from K to R . Without
loss of generality, we assume that C ⊂ Cb ; otherwise, we could always use C∩Cb instead of C.
Further, we can assume that C = Cb ; otherwise, applying Lemma 1, we could always define V
on Cb \ C such that conditions ( 2b ) – ( 2c ) keep to hold. Thus, we obtain the value V [c] for
all bounded payoffs c : K→ R .
Set
κ(T, p0)
△
= sup
p∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
(
UTp−1(ω)− UT (ω)
)
∀T > 0, p0 > 1.
Fix some positive ε < 1/4 . Applying 2ε ≤ ε1/2 , we can choose some natural k ≥ 2 such
that ε1/2 ≤ kε ≤ (k + 1)ε ≤ 2ε1/2 . Set p
△
= 1 + 1
k
; we have
ε
p− 1
≤
pε
p− 1
= (k + 1)ε ≤ 2ε1/2, 2(p− 1) =
2
k
≤ 2ε1/2.
By the definitions of the subsolution and the supersolution, for each ε > 0 , there exists a
positive T¯ such that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1/T¯ ), ω ∈ Ω , and natural h > T¯ ,T > T¯ + h ,
UT (ω) ≤ V
[
ζ
UT−h
h,T
]
(ω) + ε/2 =
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T − h
T
UT−h(z(h)) + ε/2
]
ω
, (9)
V [wλ](ω) ≥ V
[
ξ
V [wλ]
h,λ
]
(ω)− ε/3 =
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhV [wλ](z(h))− ε/3
]
ω
. (10)
By ( 3a ) , there exists Tˆ > max{T¯ , 1
ln p
} such that κ(T, p′) ≤ κ(T, p) ≤ ε/2 holds for all
T > Tˆ , p′ ∈ (1, p] .
The special choice of λ . Fix every λ < 1
(k+1)Tˆ
such that ln p
λ
is a natural number; set
h
△
=
ln p
λ
, T
△
=
p ln p
λ(p− 1)
= (k + 1)h, q
△
= p−1 = e−λh =
T − h
T
, (11)
Observe that h , T = (k + 1)h, and T − h = kh are natural. It is easy to verify that p > 1
implies that ln p < p− 1 < p ln p . Then,
p
λ
> T =
p ln p
λ(p− 1)
=
h
1− q
>
1
λ
> (k + 1)Tˆ . (12)
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In particular, from the inequalities T = h(k + 1) > (k + 1)Tˆ and T − h ≥ h > Tˆ , it follows
that T, h, λ satisfy ( 9 ) , ( 10 ) . Also, Tλ = p ln p
p−1
∈ (1, p) guarantees that
U1/λ(ω) ≤ UT (ω) + κ(T, Tλ) ≤ UT (ω) + ε/2 ∀ω ∈ Ω. (13)
Forward-tracking. For all ω ∈ Ω, from ( 9 ) it follows that
UT (ω)
(9)
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T − h
T
UT−h(z(h)) + ε/2
]
ω
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T − h
T
UT (z(h)) + ε/2 + κ(T, p)
]
ω
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+ qUT (z(h))
]
ω
+ ε. (14)
The inequality will still hold if we replace the symbol z inside the square brackets with e.g. z1 .
We have
UT (ω)
(14)
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z1(t)) dt+ qUT (z1(h))
]
ω
+ ε.
In particular, for all z ∈ K , we get
UT (z(h))
(14)
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z1(t)) dt+ qUT (z1(h))
]
z(h)
+ ε.
Substituting the corresponding part into ( 14 ) , we obtain
UT (ω) ≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+ qUT (z(h))
]
ω
+ ε
(2c)
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt+ q
2UT (z1(h))
]
z(h)
+ qε
]
ω
+ ε
(2b)
=
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt+ q
2UT (z1(h))
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε(1 + q).
Repeating, we obtain
UT (ω) ≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt
+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
q2g(z2(t)) dt+ q
3UT (z2(h))
]
z1(h)
+ q2ε
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε(1 + q)
=
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt
+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
q2g(z2(t)) dt+ q
3UT (z2(h))
]
z1(h)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε(1 + q + q2).
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Proceeding in a similar way, for all n ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω , we obtain
UT (ω) ≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
q2g(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
qng(zn(t)) dt+ q
n+1UT (zn(h))
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z1(h)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ε(1 + q + q2 + · · ·+ qn).
Backtracking. Since UT is bounded, we can choose natural n such that UT q
n+1 ≤ ε1/2 .
Then,
UT (ω) ≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
q2g(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
qng(zn(t)) dt+ ε
1/2
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z1(h)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+
ε
1− q
≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
q2g(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
qng(zn(t)) dt
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z1(h)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε1/2 +
ε
1− q
.
By the choice of p , we have ε
1−q
= pε
p−1
≤ 2ε1/2. In addition, Tλ ≥ 1 by ( 12 ) . Now, g ≥ 0
leads to
UT (ω) ≤
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ h
0
qg(z1(t)) dt+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
q2g(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
qng(zn(t)) dt
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z1(h)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε1/2 + 2ε1/2
≤
[∫ h
0
λg(z(t)) dt+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λg(z1(t)) dt+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λg(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λg(zn(t)) dt
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z1(h)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2.
Recall that λ = ln p
h
by ( 11 ) . Also, thanks to ( 11 ) , we have pe−λt ≥ pe−λh = pq = 1 for all
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t ∈ [0, h] . It follows from g ≥ 0 and V [wλ] ≥ 0 that
UT (ω) ≤
[∫ h
0
pλe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ q
[ ∫ h
0
pλe−λtg(z1(t)) dt
+ · · ·+ q
[ ∫ h
0
pλe−λtg(zn(t)) dt+ V [wλ](zn(h))
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2
(2b)
= p
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z1(t)) dt
+ · · ·+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(zn(t)) dt+ qV [wλ](zn(h))
]
zn−1(h)
. . .
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2.
Since V [wλ] is a supersolution (see ( 10 ) ), in view of q = e
−λh , we obtain
q
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(zn(t)) dt+ e
−λhV [wλ](zn(h))
]
zn−1(h)
≤ e−λhV [wλ](zn−1(h)) + qε/3.
Thus,
UT (ω) ≤ p
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z1(t)) dt+ · · ·+ q
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(zn−1(t)) dt
+e−λhV [wλ](zn−1(h))
]
zn−2(h)
. . .
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ pqnε/3 + 3ε1/2.
Proceeding in a similar way, we have
UT (ω) ≤ p
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhV [wλ](z(h))
]
ω
+ p(q + q2 + · · ·+ qn)ε/2 + 3ε1/2
≤ pV [wλ](ω) + p(1 + q + q
2 + · · ·+ qn)ε/3 + 3ε1/2
≤ pV [wλ](ω) + 2pε
1/2/3 + 3ε1/2.
Using p ≤ 1 + 1
2
and (p− 1)V [wλ] ≤ p− 1 ≤ ε
1/2 , we obtain
U1/λ
(13)
≤ UT + ε/2 ≤ pV [wλ] + 5ε
1/2 + ε/2
≤ V [wλ] + (p− 1) + 5ε
1/2 + ε/2 ≤ V [wλ] + 6ε
1/2 + ε/2 (15)
for all positive λ < 1
(k+1)Tˆ
such that ln p
λ
is a natural number.
The general case. For positive λ′ < 1
(k+1)Tˆ
, we can choose positive r > 1 such that
r ln p
λ′
is a natural number and 0 ≤ r ln p
λ′
− ln p
λ′
≤ 1 . Recall that, by the choice of Tˆ , we have
Tˆ ln p ≥ 1. By the choice of Tˆ and λ′, we obtain
1 ≤ r ≤ 1 +
λ′
ln p
≤ 1 +
1
k + 1
< p.
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First, thanks to ( 8b ) , we get
V [wλ′/r]
( 8b )
≤ V [wλ′] + 2(r − 1) ≤ V [wλ′] + 2(p− 1) ≤ V [wλ′ ] + 2ε
1/2.
Secondly, λ′/r < λ′ < 1
(k+1)Tˆ
guarantees ( 15 ) for λ = λ′/r because ln p
λ
is natural. At last,
by the definition of κ and by the choice of Tˆ and λ′, we get
U1/λ′ − Ur/λ′ ≤ κ(r/λ
′, r) ≤ κ(r/λ′, p) ≤ ε/2.
Thus, we obtain
U1/λ′ ≤ Ur/λ′ + ε/2
( 15 )
≤ V [wλ′/r] + 6ε
1/2 + ε ≤ V [wλ′] + 8ε
1/2 + ε ≤ V [wλ′ ] + 9ε
1/2
for all sufficiently small positive λ′ . By arbitrariness of positive ε , the proof is complete. 
C The proof of Proposition 2.
We will continue the notation of the previous section for values of the game value map V . For
instance, the symbols
[ ∫ h
0
a(t)g(z(t)) dt+U∗(z(h))
]
ω
,
[ ∫ h
0
b(t)g(z1(t)) dt+[c]z1(h)
]
z(h′)
denote
the values of the game value map for a payoff K ∋ z 7→
∫ h
0
a(t)g(z(t)) dt + U∗(z(h)) ∈ R at ω
and for a payoff K ∋ z1 7→
∫ h
0
b(t)g(z1(t)) dt+ V [c](z1(h)) ∈ R at z(h
′) , respectively.
Also, as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can assume that C coincides with the set of all
bounded functions c : K → R and the game value V [c] is correct for all bounded payoffs
c : K → R and satisfies ( 2b ) – ( 2c ) .
Auxiliary estimates. For each positive ε < 1/4 , we can choose natural k ≥ 2 such that
ε1/2 ≤ kε ≤ (k + 1)ε ≤ 2ε1/2. Set p
△
= 1 + 1
k
. Choose natural n such that 2p−n < ε1/2. Now,
ε
p− 1
≤
pε
p− 1
= (k + 1)ε ≤ 2ε1/2, 2(p− 1) =
2
k
≤ 2ε1/2, 2p−n < ε1/2.
Set
κ(λ, p0)
△
= sup
p′∈[1,p0]
sup
ω∈Ω
(
Uλ(ω)− Up′λ(ω)
)
∀p0 > 1, λ > 0.
By ( 3b ) , there exists positive T¯ such that κ(λ, p) ≤ ε/2 holds for all positive λ < 1/T¯ .
By the definitions of the subsolution and the supersolution, there exists positive Tˆ > T¯
such that, for all ω ∈ Ω , λ ∈ (0, 1/Tˆ ) and natural h > Tˆ , T > h+ Tˆ , one has
Uλ(ω) ≤
[
λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhUλ(z(h)) + ε/2
]
ω
, (16)
V [vT ](ω) ≥
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T − h
T
V [vT−h](z(h))− ε/3
]
ω
. (17)
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Note that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1/Tˆ ) , Uλ is bounded; then, e
−λh0Uλ < ε/2 for all sufficiently large
natural h0 . Now, ( 16 ) , ( 2c ) , and g ≤ 1 imply that Uλ(ω) ≤ λ
∫ h
0
e−λt dt + ε ≤ 2 for all
λ ∈ (0, 1/Tˆ ) .
The special choice of T . Fix every natural T > kpn+1Tˆ > kpn+1T¯ such that T (k+1)−n−1
is also natural. Then, T (1− p−1)p−n = Tkn(k + 1)−n−1 is natural as well. Set
h
△
= T (1− p−1) =
T
k + 1
, q
△
= p−1, λ
△
=
p ln p
T (p− 1)
=
ln p
h
.
In view of p ln p > p− 1 > ln p , we also have
p
λ
>
p ln p
λ(p− 1)
= T >
1
λ
>
ln p
λ(p− 1)
=
T
p
=
h(k + 1)
p
=
h
p− 1
= kh > kpnTˆ ,
p/λ > T > 1/λ > T − h = kh > h > Tˆpn > T¯pn, e−λh = p−1 = q =
T − h
T
=
k
k + 1
. (18)
For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the numbers hqi, (T − h)qi = khqi are natural; now, from (T − h)qi >
hqi > Tˆ and λpi < 1/T¯ it follows that λpi, hqi, T qi satisfy the inequalities ( 16 ) , ( 17 ) for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , n} . Moreover, Upi+1λ ≤ 2 holds for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} .
Forward-tracking. By λ < 1/Tˆ < 1/T¯ , for all ω ∈ Ω, we have
Uλ(ω)
(16)
≤
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhUλ(z(h)) + ε/2
]
ω
≤
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ qUpλ(z(h)) + ε/2 + κ(λ, p)
]
ω
≤
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ qUpλ(z(h))
]
ω
+ ε.
Analogously, by pλ < 1/Tˆ < 1/T¯ and e−pλqh = e−λh = q , for all z ∈ K ,
qUpλ(z(h)) ≤ q
[∫ qh
0
pλe−pλtg(z1(t)) dt+ e
−pλqhUp2λ(z1(qh))
]
z(h)
+ qε/2 + qκ(pλ, p)
=
[∫ qh
0
λe−pλtg(z1(t)) dt+ q
2Up2λ(z1(qh))
]
z(h)
+ qε.
Substituting it into the relation above, we obtain
Uλ(ω) ≤
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+ qUpλ(z(h))
]
ω
+ ε
≤
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+
[ ∫ qh
0
λe−pλtg(z1(t)) dt+ q
2Up2λ(z1(qh))
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε(1 + q).
Repeating, by λp2 < 1/Tˆ < 1/T¯ , we get
Uλ(ω) ≤
[ ∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+
[ ∫ qh
0
λe−pλtg(z1(t)) dt
+
[ ∫ q2h
0
λe−p
2λtg(z2(t)) dt+ q
3Up2λ(z2(q
2h))
]
z1(qh)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε(1 + q + q2).
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Proceeding in a similar way, in view of λpn < 1/Tˆ < 1/T¯ , we obtain
Uλ(ω) ≤
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(z(t)) dt+
[ ∫ qh
0
λe−pλtg(z1(t)) dt
+
[ ∫ q2h
0
λe−p
2λtg(z2(t)) dt+ · · ·+
[ ∫ qnh
0
λe−p
nλtg(zn(t)) dt
+qn+1Upn+1λ(zn(q
nh))
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
. . .
]
z1(qh)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ ε(1 + q + q2 + · · ·+ qn).
Backtracking. Note that Upn+1λ ≤ 2, g ≥ 0 . Then,
Uλ(ω) ≤
[∫ h
0
λg(z(t)) dt+
[ ∫ qh
0
λg(z1(t)) dt+
[ ∫ q2h
0
λg(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+
[ ∫ qnh
0
λg(zn(t)) dt
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
. . .
]
z1(qh)
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 2qn+1 +
ε
1− q
.
By the choice of n and p , we have 2qn+1 < ε1/2 and ε
1−q
= pε
p−1
≤ 2ε1/2 . By ( 18 ) , λ < p/T
holds. Thanks to V [vqn(T−h)] ≥ 0 , we obtain
Uλ(ω) ≤
[∫ h
0
λg(z(t)) dt+
[ ∫ qh
0
λg(z1(t)) dt+
[ ∫ q2h
0
λg(z2(t)) dt
+ · · ·+
[ ∫ qnh
0
λg(zn(t)) dt
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
. . .
]
z2(q2h)
]
z1(qh)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2
(2c)
≤
[
p
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
p
T
∫ qh
0
g(z1(t)) dt+ · · ·+
[ p
T
∫ qnh
0
g(zn(t)) dt
+qnV [vqn(T−h)](zn(q
nh))
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
. . .
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2
(2b)
= p
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ qh
0
g(z1(t)) dt+ · · ·+
[ 1
T
∫ qnh
0
g(zn(t)) dt
+qn+1V [vqn(T−h)](zn(q
nh))
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
. . .
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2.
Recall that qnT = qn−1(T − h) > Tˆ , q = q
nT−qnh
qnT
(see ( 18 ) ); also, ( 17 ) holds for qnh, qnT .
Thus, [
1
T
∫ qnh
0
g(zn(t)) dt+ q
n+1V [vqn(T−h)](zn(q
nh))
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
= qn
[
1
qnT
∫ qnh
0
g(zn(t)) dt+ qV [vqn(T−h)](zn(q
nh))
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
(17)
≤ qnV [vqnT ](zn−1(q
n−1h)) + qnε/3
(18)
= qnV [vqn−1(T−h)](zn−1(q
n−1h)) + qnε/3.
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Then,
Uλ(ω) ≤ p
[
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
[
1
T
∫ qh
0
g(z1(t)) dt+ · · ·+
[ 1
T
∫ qn−1h
0
g(zn−1(t)) dt
+qnV [vqn−1(T−h)](zn−1(q
n−1h))
]
zn−1(qn−1h)
. . .
]
z(h)
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2 + pqnε/3.
Proceeding in a similar way, since qi−1(T − h)
( 18 )
= qiT holds for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} , we
obtain
Uλ(ω) ≤ p
[ 1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+ qV [vT−h](z(h))
]
ω
+ 3ε1/2 + p(qn + · · ·+ q)ε/3
≤ pV [vT ](ω) + 3ε
1/2 + p(qn + · · ·+ q + 1)ε/3
≤ p− 1 + V [vT ](ω) + 5ε
1/2
≤ V [vT ](ω) + 7ε
1/2
By ( 18 ) and T > T¯ , we get κ(1/T, p ln p
p−1
)
( 18 )
= κ(1/T, Tλ) ≤ κ(1/T, p) ≤ ε/2 . Hence,
U1/T ≤ Uλ + ε/2 ≤ V [vT ] + 7ε
1/2 + ε/2 (19)
for all positive T > kpn+1Tˆ if T/(k + 1)n+1 is also a natural number.
The general case. Consider every positive T ′ > kmax
(
pn+2Tˆ , (k + 1)n+1
)
. Now, we can
choose a positive r > 1 such that T
′
r(k+1)n+1
is natural and 0 ≤ T ′− T
′
r
≤ (k+1)n+1 holds. By
the choice of Tˆ and T ′, we also obtain
1 ≤ r ≤
(
1−
(k + 1)n+1
T ′
)−1
≤ 1 +
(k + 1)n+1
T ′
< 1 +
1
k
= p.
Now, it follows from T ′/r ≥ T ′/p ≥ kpn+1Tˆ ≥ T¯ that, first, by the definition of κ ,
U1/T ′ − Ur/T ′ ≤ κ(r/T
′, r) ≤ κ(r/T ′, p) ≤ ε/2,
secondly, ( 19 ) holds for T = T ′/r. At last, thanks to ( 8a ) , we also obtain
V [vT ′/r] ≤ V [vT ′] + 2(r − 1) ≤ V [vT ′] + 2(p− 1) ≤ V [vT ′ ] + ε
1/2.
Thus,
U1/T ′ ≤ Ur/T ′ + ε/2
( 19 )
≤ V [vT ′/r] + 7ε
1/2 + ε ≤ V [vT ′ ] + 8ε
1/2 + ε ≤ V [vT ′] + 9ε
1/2
for all sufficiently large positive T ′. By arbitrariness of positive ε , the proof is complete. 
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